INTRODUCTION
Around the turn of this century, a "highly-charged" debate erupted over unpublished federal appellate court opinions. 1 Some, including most notably Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, strongly argued that the common prohibition against citation to those opinions posed no constitutional problems, and that the prohibition allowed appellate judges to efficiently discharge their duties. 2 parties may cite them, 10 Memo opinions purportedly lack precedential value. 11 Congress has also denied precedential status to some Tax Court opinions. Under Section 7463(b), 12 so-called Summary or "S" opinions can neither be appealed nor cited as precedent. These opinions relate to cases decided under an essentially elective, streamlined set of procedures and involve relatively small amounts of tax liabilities. 13 The justifications for Memo and S opinions seem straightforward. Like other federal courts, the Tax Court faces a heavy workload, and Memo opinions might allow Tax Court judges to decide clear-cut cases without worrying about the dangers of establishing precedent. S opinions also go hand-in-hand with streamlined case procedures, without which taxpayers could judicially contest their tax liabilities only by following generally cumbersome procedural rules. 14 The nonprecedential status of these Tax Court opinions gives rise to practical problems, however. 15 A judicial exposition of a case is difficult to ignore, and taxpayers frequently invoke Memo or S opinions as authority in connection with their tax disputes, whether in front of the IRS, the Tax Court, or other federal courts. 16 And the Tax Court seemingly cannot ignore its own opinions. 17 Although plenty of cases dismiss Memo opinions as 10 .
See Press Release, U.S. Tax Court (June 26, 2012), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/ 062612.pdf (providing citation forms for Memo opinions and noting that such opinions "generally address cases which do not involve novel legal issues and in which the law is settled or the result is factually driven"). 12.
Unless noted otherwise, Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (I.R.C.), codified at 26 U.S.C.
13. See I.R.C. § 7463(a) (2012) (prescribing dollar limits for cases eligible for Section 7463 procedures).
14. See S. REP. NO. 91-552 (1969) , reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 614 (explaining how stare decisis and judicial review procedures mandate a degree of formality in Tax Court proceedings, and these procedures may be burdensome to taxpayers litigating relatively small amounts).
15. See Erik M. Jensen, American Indian Law Meets the Internal Revenue Code: Warbus v. Commissioner, 74 N.D. L. REV. 691, 692 n.9 (1998) ("There is a neverending dispute within the Tax Court about the precedential effect of the court's not-officially-published 'memorandum opinions . . . .'").
16. See infra Part II. Generally speaking, the value of a judicial precedent falls along a spectrum, with some authorities being accorded only persuasive value and others being viewed as binding, unless a justification for abandoning the principles of stare decisis applies. Practices regarding Memo opinions cover the spectrum. [Vol. 101:2065 nonprecedential, other cases treat them like persuasive or binding authorities. 18 More troubling still, Memo opinions sometimes address controversial issues of tax law, and not only heavily factual or clear-cut legal issues. 19 The ambiguous weight of Memo opinions thus sows confusion in the tax law. 20 S opinions also raise problems. Section 7463(b) denies the precedential effect of S opinions, and uncertainty lingers over whether this statute displaces issue preclusion doctrines. 21 Also, a case that seems suitable for streamlined procedures sometimes turns out not to be, and the Tax Court may address important issues through a nonprecedential, nonreviewable opinion. 22 Issues relating to the scope of the judicial power further complicate matters. If Judge Arnold's view holds, federal courts, including the Tax Court, do not enjoy the constitutional authority to deprive their opinions of precedential value. Under this view, the categorical denial of precedential status to Memo opinions reflects an unconstitutional practice.
The statutory prohibition against citation to S opinions adds a further wrinkle to this analysis. Some who defend the use of nonprecedential opinions argue that classifying an opinion one way or another reflects a decision historically committed to judicial discretion. 23 If that is correct, then Section 7463(b) may reflect an improper legislative encroachment on the judicial power. That is, if judges, and only judges, may decide the precedential weight of their opinions, then Congress has no business setting the precedential status of S opinions. 24 "expressly decided" an issue related to the application of the Section 7502 mailbox rule).
18. See infra Part II. See also, e.g., Bedrosian v. Comm'r, 143 T.C. 83 (2014) (relying on various Memo opinions which previously held that pass-thru partners under Section 6231(a)(9) include disregarded entities, consistent with the IRS's conclusion in Rev 356-59 (2001) ; see also id. at 359 (concluding that "judges often did pick and choose which English statutes and common law precedents were binding within their states" and that "even those judges who looked to the common law as the source of American law felt that the judicial power included the right to decide whether an American statute complied with the common law").
24.
See generally Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-
The continuing controversy over the Tax Court's constitutional status complicates matters even further. Originally, Congress established the Board of Tax Appeals as "an independent agency in the executive branch," 25 suggesting that the court exercises the executive power. Later, Congress renamed the Board, and in 1969 established the United States Tax Court as a "court of record" under Article I of the Constitution, 26 suggesting that it exercises the judicial power. But the case law remains unclear on whether the Tax Court exercises the executive power or the judicial power, and that determination may affect whether stare decisis applies to Tax Court opinions.
This Essay tries to bring some sense to the morass of practical and constitutional issues related to Memo and S opinions. Part II explains the ongoing controversy over the constitutionality of nonprecedential federal court opinions. It also illustrates the significant confusion that Memo opinions have caused and briefly touches on potential problems related to bench opinions.
Part III explains the constitutional and practical issues raised by the statutory denial of precedential status to S opinions. This discussion assumes that the Tax Court exercises the judicial power, but Part IV examines recent developments that might cast doubt on that view. Part V argues that the Tax Court should abandon its nonprecedential designation of Memo opinions, and that Congress should repeal Section 7463(b)'s limitation regarding the precedential value of S opinions.
II. THE NATURE OF THE NONPRECEDENTIAL PROBLEM

A. THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
Faye Anastasoff thought she had just beat the deadline when she mailed her 1992 refund claim to the IRS on April 13, 1996. Although the IRS would not actually receive her claim until April 16, 1996 (one day after the April 15, 1996 deadline set by Section 6511(a)), Section 7502 provides a special Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 194 (2001) 27 Under that rule, a filing will be treated as timely filed if a taxpayer mails it by the due date, even if the IRS receives it after that date.
Section 7502 in fact established the timeliness of Anastasoff's refund claim under Section 6511(a), but she ran into another problem. A different statute, Section 6511(b), generally limits a taxpayer's refund to the amounts she paid in the three years prior to the filing of a refund claim. 28 Anastasoff had paid the taxes at issue on April 15, 1993, 29 but the IRS received the claim three years and one day later, on April 16, 1996. The IRS consequently denied her refund claim, concluding that although Section 7502's mailbox rule made her claim timely under Section 6511(a), that rule did nothing to alter Section 6511(b)'s separate three-year limitation.
Anastasoff challenged this harsh result in court. After losing in the district court, she appealed to the Eighth Circuit. 30 Although the Eighth Circuit had previously decided the exact same issue, and in a way adverse to Anastasoff, that ruling came in an unpublished opinion. 31 And, under an Eighth Circuit rule, those opinions lacked precedential value and parties generally could not cite them. 32 Consequently, Anastasoff argued that the prior, indistinguishable case did not bind the court, and it could decide the Section 6511(b) issue in her favor.
But the Eighth Circuit declared its own rule unconstitutional. Judge Arnold, writing on behalf of a unanimous panel, concluded that the "judicial power" under Article III did not grant courts the "power . . . to choose for themselves, from among all the cases they decide, those that they will follow in the future, and those that they need not." 33 In fact, the obligation to follow 27.
See I.R.C. § 7502 (2012).
28.
See I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A) (2012) ("If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period prescribed in subsection (a), the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.").
29. Under Section 6513, taxes paid prior to the due date for filing a return are generally treated as paid on the due date. precedent reflected "the historic method of judicial decision-making," 34 and this obligation separated the judicial power from a "dangerous union with the legislative power." 35 Judge Arnold did not, however, suggest that precedents could not be overruled, nor did he conclude that every opinion requires publication. Rather, precedent could be overcome "by some 'special justification,'" 36 and courts could choose which opinions appear in official reporters. But the fact of publication could not control the authoritative value of an opinion. Although treating every opinion as precedent would burden alreadyoverworked courts, the remedy for scarce resources was "not to create an underground body of law for one place and time only." 37 The court consequently held against Anastasoff, believing itself bound by its prior decision. 38 Predictably, Anastasoff generated a firestorm of commentary. 39 Academics debated the accuracy of Judge Arnold's historical analysis and the alleged dangers of nonprecedential opinions. 40 Judge Arnold's analysis also drew attention from other judges, given his express criticism of them. 41 In Judge Arnold's view, the federal circuit courts were improperly telling the bar, "We may have decided this question the opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind us today, and, what is more, you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday." 42 In that supported his client. 44 He thus cited that unpublished case, Rice v. Chater, in a footnote in his opening brief. 45 The court then moved to sanction the attorney, and it ordered him to show cause to escape discipline. The attorney defended himself by citing Anastasoff, which implied that the Ninth Circuit's own no-citation rule may be unconstitutional.
Judge Kozinski, writing for a unanimous panel, flatly rejected that argument. Although the Eighth Circuit had withdrawn its opinion in Anastasoff-the IRS eventually paid the taxpayer her refund and the case became moot-that opinion retained "persuasive force." 46 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit would address the speculations about the constitutionality of no-citation rules and "lay [them] to rest." 47 The court acknowledged the long history of stare decisis and the Framers' familiarity with the concept. 48 However, modern understandings differed from the Framers'. 49 Under current practices, opinions of appellate courts, with limited exceptions, rigidly bind successor courts and lower courts, whereas precedents at common law were much more malleable. 50 The adoption of no-citation rules thus reflected a natural accommodation of the new and growing role stare decisis played in federal courts. By prohibiting citations to unpublished opinions, appellate courts could properly choose to handcuff future courts only when circumstances so warranted. 51 Judge Kozinski also doubted whether the phrase "judicial power" actually imposed any "limitation on how courts conduct their business." 52 Rather, constitutional limitations on courts came from other sources, like the "Cases" or "Controversies" requirements. The granting of the Article III judicial power was "more likely descriptive than prescriptive." 53 The Ninth Circuit thus rejected the lawyer's reliance on Anastasoff but decided not to sanction him, concluding that his misconduct was not willful.
44.
Id.; see also 9th CIR. R. Id.
48.
Id. at 1161-66 (discussing the differences between the founders' conception of precedent and our current view of the practice).
49.
Id. at 1163 ("[O]ur concept of precedent today is far stricter than that which prevailed at the time of the Framing.").
50.
Id. at 1174 ("While we agree with Anastasoff that the principle of precedent was well established in the common law courts by the time Article III of the Constitution was written, we do not agree that it was known and applied in the strict sense in which we apply binding authority today.").
51.
See id. at 1172 ("Designating an opinion as binding circuit authority is a weighty decision that cannot be taken lightly, because its effects are not easily reversed.").
52.
Id. at 1160.
53.
Id. at 1161.
In 2006, the Judicial Conference of the United States amended the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and abolished all no-citation rules. 54 But new Rule 32.1 does not actually address any of the contentious issues underlying unpublished status, such as their appropriate precedential status or the constitutional issues related to any denial of their precedential status. 55 The new rule instead simply allows parties to cite unpublished opinions, and the theoretical debate regarding the relationship between the judicial power and stare decisis continues.
B. THE PROBLEM IN PRACTICE: MEMO OPINIONS
The theoretical debate over the scope of the judicial power, although undoubtedly important, should not obscure the practical problems created by nonprecedential opinions. Whatever one thinks about their constitutionality (this writer sides with Arnold), nonprecedential opinions, although designed to limit confusion, can actually have the opposite effect. A tension almost automatically arises when a court issues an opinion but then instructs future litigants to ignore it. Both taxpayers and the government pay attention to judicial expositions on questions of law, and a warning to avoid those expositions frequently does not work. The Tax Court's attempts to deny precedential status to its Memo opinions demonstrates this.
Congress formally authorized the issuance of Memo opinions in 1928 and the Tax Court, 56 then known as the Board of Tax Appeals, "soon adopted the policy of not citing prior memorandum opinions in its decisions." 57 However, this no-citation policy did not last long. 58 presiding judge wrote that, although a Memo opinion was "supposed to be limited to . . . having no value as a precedent," 59 a lawyer could cite it if he found "some precedent of value . . . even though the opinion does not appear in the bound volumes of the reports of the court." 60 In response, practitioners urged the Tax Court to officially publish Memo opinions in its printed volumes. 61 Outside companies already published Memo opinions, and practitioners came to rely on them. 62 However, the Tax Court declined this request, concluding that it should instead take greater care to ensure that Memo opinions addressed only issues of limited prospective importance. 63 Unfortunately, Memo opinions continue to address significant issues. In Helmer v. Commissioner, for example, the Tax Court laid the foundation for the most recent wave of criminal tax shelters. 64 In that case, decided via a Memo opinion in 1975, the court held that a small, informal partnership's granting of an option did not create a liability for purposes of determining the partners' bases in their partnership interests. 65 Consequently, the partners could not increase their bases upon the granting of the option, and they recognized gain when cash distributions were later made to them. 66 Helmer dealt with a sleepy set of facts, but its holding would have explosive consequences a couple of decades later. Practitioners eventually recognized that the Tax Court's rule could be manipulated to dodge billions in taxes. 67 Failing to treat an option as a liability may have had adverse tax consequences for the Helmer taxpayers, but that holding, when applied to a partnership's assumption of a partner's liability, meant that taxpayers could grossly inflate their outside bases and generate huge tax losses. 68 Although the government, relying on judicial doctrines, successfully challenged many Son-of-BOSS transactions on their merits, 70 Helmer nonetheless damaged the tax system. Some taxpayers escaped liability entirely because the statute of limitations on assessment had run. 71 Courts protected other taxpayers from penalties, concluding that they could "justifiably rely on Helmer and its progeny." 72 If Memo opinions really lacked precedential value, Helmer should have been ignored. But the Tax Court treats Memo opinions inconsistently, sometimes dismissing them because of their status and sometimes giving them weight. 73 This inconsistent approach presents a whipsaw opportunitygiven rise to numerous civil and criminal controversies. taxpayers or the IRS might follow Memo opinions when they are helpful, but ignore them when they are not.
Like everyone else, circuit courts sometimes give Memo opinions weight, and at other times ignore them. 74 In Kornman v. United States, for example, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "[a]lthough tax court memorandum opinions have no precedential value in tax court, we have previously relied upon them." 75 Yet in InverWorld v. Commissioner, the D.C. Circuit dismissed an on-point Tax Court decision because it was "a memorandum opinion . . . which has no precedential effect." 76 The significant issues addressed in Memo opinions compounds the problems associated with this inconsistency. In theory, Memo opinions are issued only regarding clear-cut cases, where settled law directs the inevitable result. 77 But in practice, Memo opinions often address contentious or novel issues. 78 In Helmer, for example, the Tax Court acknowledged that it confronted a "unique situation." 79 And in Campbell v. Commissioner, the Court addressed a question that has filled endless law review pages: whether a partner's receipt of a profits interest in a partnership reflects a recognition event. 80 190 (1986) ] . . . is a Memorandum Opinion. Therefore, we applied settled law to the facts before us. Those facts and the facts before us today are quite similar, yet, today, we reach a different result. I assume, therefore, that settled law has changed.").
74 Addressing novel questions through Memo opinions might be less concerning if they were always answered correctly. But the Tax Court itself has acknowledged errors in its previous Memo opinions. 81 Commentators have also criticized the holdings of various Memo opinions. 82 Of course, the possibility of appellate review may sort out any problems with a hastily written Memo opinion. Appellate courts have in fact reversed numerous Memo opinions, on both legal and factual grounds. 83 However, the appellate courts maintain a somewhat strange relationship with the Tax Court. Section 7482 suggests that appellate courts ought to apply de novo review to the Tax Court's interpretations of the tax code. 84 However, the appellate courts occasionally offer some deference to the Tax Court's legal interpretations. 85 Consequently, a faulty Memo opinion may enjoy a better chance of surviving on appeal than a federal district court opinion. Given the Tax Court's large share of federal tax cases, a poorly reasoned Memo opinion poses a greater threat than a poorly reasoned federal district court opinion.
81.
See 84. Section 7482 provides that the circuit courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tax Court . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions." I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1) (2012). This language suggests that circuit courts should apply de novo review to the Tax Court's interpretations of the I.R.C.
85.
See generally Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835 (2014) (explaining how some courts provide deference to the Tax Court's legal analysis, even though that approach runs counter to Section 7482 and to the majority view). [Vol. 101:2065 Any possible retrenchment of the Golsen rule, under which the Tax Court defers to appellate courts, would compound these problems further. 86 That is, the Tax Court believes, rightly or wrongly, that its national jurisdiction makes it directly answerable only to the Supreme Court and to the Congress. 87 But under the Golsen rule, the Tax Court supports judicial economy and voluntarily follows the law of the circuit in which a taxpayer's appeal would lie. 88 If the Tax Court returns to its pre-Golsen practice, the prospect of an appellate reversal would not necessarily influence Memo opinions.
Of course, even if Golsen were abandoned, an appellate court's reasoning might persuade the Tax Court to change its position. And even if the Tax Court stubbornly adheres to a position contrary to the relevant circuit court's, a litigant could usually appeal and secure a reversal. But none of these possibilities detracts from the general point that poorly reasoned Memo opinions pose dangers greater than those associated with ordinary federal district court opinions, published or unpublished. One can always return to Helmer if she believes otherwise.
Ultimately, the uncertain precedential status of Memo opinions hurts the tax system. Memo opinions are nonprecedential, except when they are not. 89 
86.
See he logic behind the Golsen doctrine is not that we lack the authority to render a decision inconsistent with any Court of Appeals (including the one to which an appeal would lie), but that it would be futile and wasteful to do so where we would surely be reversed."); Cohen, supra note 9 at 6 ("If the Fifth Circuit reverses us on a legal issue and the issue comes up again, we are not bound to follow the law of the Fifth Circuit.").
88. It is impossible to quantify the effects of the problem, but it surely is time to consider the adoption of a consistent approach.
C. A POTENTIAL PROBLEM: BENCH OPINIONS
Division and Memo opinions each follow the procedures described in Sections 7459 and 7460. 90 Those provisions generally require that, for each Tax Court proceeding, a judge issue a report (i.e., a draft opinion) and provide that report to the Chief Judge. 91 Unless the Chief Judge determines that the entire court should review it, 92 the draft opinion leads to a "decision of the Tax Court." 93 Consequently, each opinion type (Division or Memo) goes through a statutorily mandated review process and each carries the weight of the Tax Court's decisional authority, not merely that of a single judge.
The final sentence of Section 7459(b), added in 1982, provides an exception from these general procedural requirements. 94 Under the provision, statutory requirements will be "met if findings of fact or opinion are stated orally and recorded in the transcript of the proceedings," subject to any limitations the Tax Court prescribes. 95 Under Tax Court Rule 152(a), a judge may, "in the exercise of discretion," issue a so-called oral or Bench opinion if she is "satisfied as to the factual conclusions to be reached in the case and that the law to be applied thereto is clear." 96 Although they may be appealed, Bench opinions, unlike Division or Memo opinions, do not receive pre-issuance review from the Chief Judge. Instead, the authoring judge will read the opinion into the record prior to the close of the relevant trial session and promptly send transcripts to the parties. 97 Bench opinions apparently have not given rise to the same level of controversy as Memo opinions. The case law reflects some occasions where a judge may have incorrectly decided a case via the streamlined Bench opinion heart of the common law system and serve as a critical component of what we understand to be the law," and that the opinion is intended to "guide future litigants. See id.
92.
Id. § 7460(b) ("The report of the division shall become the report of the Tax Court within 30 days after such report by the division, unless within such period the chief judge has directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax Court.").
93. 100 It is possible that a litigant will find a favorable opinion and rely on it, notwithstanding the prohibitions contained in the Tax Court rules. 101 Any taxpayer reliance on Bench opinions would seemingly implicate the same constitutional issues related to Memo opinions. Just as some litigants challenged the appellate rules denying precedential status to unpublished appellate opinions, some litigants might challenge the Tax Court rules denying effect to Bench opinions.
Bench opinions, however, seem qualitatively different from Division or Memo opinions. The latter opinions follow a statutory review process and eventually lead to a decision of the Tax Court. Bench opinions do not actually follow any pre-issuance review process and, though they reflect a decision of the Tax Court, they are only deemed to satisfy the procedural requirements of sections 7459 and 7460. They thus seem roughly analogous to opinions issued by federal district judges, which do not establish any "law of the district." 102 do not care whether the decision under consideration was from another judge of the same district, the same circuit, or somewhere else entirely." (footnote omitted)). Professor Mead argues that the district courts have the authority, although not the obligation, to establish stare decisis within a district. See id. at 805-09. Unlike district courts, which look to circuit courts to establish the law of the region, the Tax Court enjoys national jurisdiction and its obligation to follow stare decisis likely stems in part from the geographical breadth of its powers, although courts generally do not identify the source of the Tax Court's obligations. See Estate of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d 591, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1993) ("It is well established that the Tax Court is governed by the doctrine of stare decisis. . . . Indeed, the doctrine applies with special force in the tax context, given the important reliance interests effect of Division or Memo opinions, it seems unlikely that that mandate would apply to Bench opinions.
Putting constitutional issues aside, functional concerns militate against the precedential status of Bench opinions. Sections 7459 and 7460 establish procedures under which the Tax Court will "decide all cases uniformly, regardless of where, in its nationwide jurisdiction, they may arise." 103 The statutory review provisions, which might independently establish a stare decisis requirement, 104 do not apply to Bench opinions, which were authorized only recently. If those opinions nonetheless bound the entire court, it is hard to see how uniformity could be achieved.
That is not to say that Bench opinions raise no concerns. In a recent article, Professor Keith Fogg surveyed more than 200 such opinions and found that their use varied widely among Tax Court judges. 105 One judge disposed of 60 cases via Bench opinion, employing them more than twice as frequently as any other judge. However, several judges rarely issued them.
Given the breadth of Rule 152, under which a judge can issue a reviewfree Bench opinion in almost any case, some further guidance on Bench opinions would be helpful. 106 As it stands now, the Rule leaves the decision to issue an opinion solely within the discretion of the authoring judge. Given their newfound accessibility, the significance of Bench opinions will likely rise, especially if practitioners uncover decisions addressing key issues. However, these concerns remain speculative, and the remainder of this Essay will focus on the more concrete issues raised by Memo and S opinions. THE PROBLEM COMPOUNDED
A. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUE
The Tax Court's inconsistent treatment of Memo opinions stems from its own practices. Consequently, in assessing whether purportedly nonprecedential opinions comply with the Constitution, we can focus solely on the Tax Court. Summary or "S" opinions, by contrast, present inter-branch concerns.
S opinions relate to "small cases" 107 conducted under Section 7463. 108 Under that statute, a taxpayer can elect out of the normal procedural rules that apply to Tax Court litigation. To make this election, the taxpayer's dispute generally cannot involve more than $50,000. 109 The Tax Court must concur with the taxpayer's election and if it does so, the "case[] will be conducted as informally as possible consistent with orderly procedure." 110 When it decides a case, the Tax Court usually must "report in writing all its findings of fact, opinions, and memorandum opinions." 111 However, Section 7463(a) lifts that requirement for small cases. Although S opinions must be submitted to the Chief Judge for review, they may contain only the final decision, "with a brief summary of the reasons therefor." 112 Neither party can appeal the Tax Court's decision in small cases. Also, Section 7463(b) denies the prospective effect of S opinions, saying that they "shall not be treated as a precedent for any other case."
Section 7463(b) adds a wrinkle to the controversy over nonprecedential opinions. The Arnold-Kozinski debate involved a court's power to deny precedential status to its own decisions, not a legislature's intrusion into this arguably purely judicial function. The statute thus raises separation of powers issues not implicated in the earlier debate.
Issues power to reason to the outcome of a case." 115 Thomas Healy argues that statutes which limit a court's ability to follow precedent strip away at the legitimacy of judicial opinions. 116 And if Congress handcuffs a court and prevents it from justifying its decisions on its preferred grounds (such as its respect for stare decisis), Congress has interfered with the judicial power. 117 Some commentators take a different view. Michael Stokes Paulsen focuses on constitutional cases and contemplates that respect for stare decisis stems from the exercise of judicial discretion. 118 Whether to follow prior cases, such as those involving abortion rights, and what weight to give them, involves "[m]ere nonconstitutional policy considerations." 119 Congress can thus displace the judiciary's weighing of those considerations and deny prospective precedential effect to prior opinions, at least in constitutional cases. John Harrison also believes that Congress can play a role in setting the rules of precedent, arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause allows the legislature to prescribe any precedent-related rule that a court could itself establish. 120 The case law on congressional control of stare decisis remains unsettled, probably because statutes like Section 7463(b) are so rare. United States v. Klein, a Civil War-era case, provides the leading authority in the area. 121 Klein addressed the Abandoned and Captured Property Act, which granted the sale proceeds of property seized in insurrectionary states to the original owners, if those owners had not "given any aid or comfort to the . . . rebellion." 122 Although many original owners provided such aid or comfort, President Lincoln offered a pardon to anyone who executed an oath of allegiance to the United States. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that persons so pardoned were cleansed of their prior involvement in the rebellion, such that they were entitled to the sale proceeds of their seized property. 123 Congress was displeased with that decision and could have flatly repealed the Abandoned and Captured Property Act. changing how a pardon would bear on an owner's entitlement to sale proceeds. Under the new statute, the acceptance of a pardon, without denial of involvement in the rebellion, conclusively proved that the owner aided the rebellion, and courts could not use the pardon to establish otherwise. Additionally, courts would immediately lose jurisdiction whenever an original owner accepted the pardon.
In Klein, the Supreme Court struck down the new statute, concluding that it "passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power." 124 Although Congress could define the Court's appellate jurisdiction, the new statute was "founded solely on the application of a rule of decision." 125 And Congress lacked the power to "prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way." 126 The Court distinguished its prior decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge, 127 saying that "[n]o arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in that case" and that the Court was simply "left to apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances" created by congressional amendments. 128 The precise scope of Klein remains "'deeply puzzling.'" 129 On the one hand, all agree that Congress cannot simply tell a court how to decide a case. On the other hand, congressional amendments can change the outcomes of pending cases. These two principles should provide, at a minimum, a clear framework for testing the constitutionality of Section 7463(b). But application of the principles may present difficulties.
124.
Klein Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society nicely illustrates this. 130 That case involved section 318 of the so-called Northwest Timber Compromise, through which Congress addressed agency guidelines for timber harvesting in 13 national forests that contained northern spotted owls. 131 Environmental groups and industry groups had each challenged the guidelines under numerous statutes, arguing that the guidelines did not go far enough to protect the environment, or that they went too far and threatened the local economies. 132 Congress, in response, passed section 318 and gave something to both groups. Under subsections (a)(1) and (2) of the statute, Congress ordered the government to sell specific quantities of timber before the end of the 1990 fiscal year. 133 However, under subsections (b)(3) and (5), Congress prohibited timber harvesting altogether in some designated areas for the remainder of that fiscal year. 134 To resolve the pending cases, subsection (b)(6) announced a special rule:
[T]he Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests. . . known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases This statute apparently directed the judiciary to hold for the government in specific cases, even identifying the cases by name and docket numbers. The government consequently invoked the statute and sought dismissal of the relevant suits.
But the environmental groups resisted and argued that subsection (b)(6) violated the separation of powers. environmental laws," but instead sought to "perform functions reserved to the courts by Article III of the Constitution." 137 A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. 138 In the Court's view, section 318 in fact amended existing law. 139 Prior to the enactment of the statute, the government, to defend against the groups' lawsuits, would need to establish its compliance with numerous environmental statutes. 140 But section 318 changed that. Under subsection (b)(6)(A), the government would only need to show that it had complied with the restrictions contained in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5). 141 In this way, section 318 created new law and did not compel the judiciary to reach a particular result under old law. Although (b)(6) made references to specific pending cases, those references were really just an easy way to identify and amend the various environmental statutes at issue. 142 Robertson seems to reaffirm the two basic principles previously alluded to. That is, if Congress directs the result of a particular case through a change in the underlying law, no constitutional violation occurs. But if Congress leaves that law alone and tells the judiciary how to decide a case, it violates the separation of powers.
Unfortunately, there is a blurry line between a statute that directs a result and one that amends underlying law. With only a slight difference in statutory wording, the statute in Robertson would have been struck down. 143 The case law on congressional control over stare decisis thus remains at best unsettled and at worst hopelessly confused. 144 So what does this all mean for Section 7463(b)? It is difficult to say. On the one hand, Section 7463(b) does not map neatly onto the statute declared 137 .
Id. at 1316. 138.
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 437 (1992).
139.
Id. at 438.
140.
Id.
141.
142.
Id. at 440. 143.
Consider a simplified example and assume that a federal agency must satisfy six different statutes to establish its compliance with environmental laws, but the agency complies only with two. If Congress simply says that courts must find that the agency's existing practices comply with all laws, the statute would run afoul of Klein. However, if Congress directs that satisfaction of the two criteria will establish compliance, the statute would be constitutional under Robertson because Congress apparently amended the law to reduce the number of requirements. , https://www.irs.gov/ pub/irs-wd/02-0002.pdf (discussing a letter from an IRS official expressing view that S opinions related to reimbursed employee business expenses of school bus drivers do not "properly apply the law" and "are not precedent for any other case").
erase it entirely, and uncertainty lingers over the prospective effect of S opinions. 148 In Mitchell v. Commissioner, for example, the Tax Court danced around whether collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) applies to matters decided in S cases. 149 In Mitchell, the taxpayer argued that a pension payment received in her 2001 tax year did not constitute gross income. She had litigated the same issue for her 2000 tax year, and the Tax Court had ruled against her in an S opinion. 150 The IRS consequently argued that she could not raise the argument, relying on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 151 The Tax Court declined to address that argument, but Judge Holmes wrote a lengthy concurrence explaining that collateral estoppel should apply to issues decided in S cases. 152 Although the absence of appellate review usually forecloses the application of collateral estoppel, taxpayers choose S case procedures voluntarily. Nothing in Section 7463 prevents a taxpayer from litigating her dispute under the court's regular, more formal procedures, under which she can appeal any adverse decision to a circuit court. Also, although Section 7463(b)'s plain terms denies precedential value to S opinions, that simply means that courts cannot cite those opinions for their statements on a point of law. 153 Section 7463(b) does not wipe out all effects related to S opinions.
To illustrate the problems caused by Section 7463(b)'s potential elimination of collateral estoppel, Judge Holmes described a particularly wasteful series of cases. 154 In the first case, the taxpayer lost on an issue decided through an S opinion. 155 The taxpayer argued the same issue in a later case for different tax years and also presented a second issue, losing both issues in a Memo opinion. 156 In a third case, the taxpayer argued the second 148 .
In issue once again, losing in another Memo opinion. 157 The taxpayer still had not given up and presented the second issue for more tax years, at which point the Tax Court penalized her and employed collateral estoppel to reject consideration of the repetitive arguments. 158 But that apparently was not enough, because the taxpayer again argued the second issue, with (predictably) the same lack of success. 159 Of course, this series of cases involved an unusually nettlesome taxpayer. Yet it illustrates how repetitious arguments can consume judicial resources. 160 Such arguments present an especially serious concern in the tax law, where the combination of the annual accounting rule and recurring items of income or deduction set the stage for repeat battles between a taxpayer and the IRS. 161 Unfortunately, Judge Holmes' concurrence did not lead the Tax Court to subsequently address the relationship between Section 7463(b) and collateral estoppel. A later Division opinion simply acknowledges that the issue remains "controversial." 162 Consequently, confusion lingers over the prospective effect of S opinions.
Reasonable minds can differ over whether collateral estoppel should apply to S cases. However, that matter should be settled by the Tax Court, not Congress. 163 To the extent that Section 7463(b) displaces the Tax Court's authority to determine that issue, the statute reflects poor policy. The Tax Court deals with many vexatious litigants, and absent a special justification, it should independently determine the preclusive effects of its judgments. Section 7463(b) can also lead to problems when the Tax Court decides a difficult issue through S procedures. In Cutts v. Commissioner, for example, the Tax Court addressed a complex issue of first impression under Section 7872, which re-characterizes interest paid on some below-market loans. 165 The court candidly acknowledged that it "dropped the ball" when it allowed the case to proceed under S procedures. 166 To remedy this problem, the court offered a "thorough analysis" 167 of the issues, noting that collateral estoppel could affect the taxpayer's other tax years. 168 Cutts nicely illustrates how Section 7463(b) fosters uncertainty. As with every S opinion, Cutts prominently announces that it "MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE." 169 But it then offers an extended analysis of a recurring tax issue. 170 And it then notes that its reasoning may have preclusive effect in future litigation. 171 Taxpayers may be understandably confused by this. Can they really ignore the court's "thorough analysis" of Section 7872? 172 And what weight does the court's statement about collateral estoppel receive? The opinion announces that it cannot be cited as precedent but then says that it may close off arguments for different tax years. 173 If the Tax Court eventually addresses whether collateral estoppel applies to S cases, can a party cite Cutts, as precedent, to reveal the court's prior statements on the subject? Or does the prohibition against citation to S cases also apply when addressing the effect of S cases?
Luckily, Cutts reflects a fairly unusual case, and the vast majority of S cases do not present such riddles. 174 But Cutts is not alone in addressing a significant Id.
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Id. ("By virtue of the principle of Commissioner v. Sunnen, our decision may affect other tax years of petitioners." (citation omitted)).
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Id. at cover page.
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Id. at *4-9.
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Id. at *9. This statement requires some speculation because the small case procedures became effective in 1971, but the Tax Court did not start releasing its S opinions until 2001. Two practitioners obtained permission to review paper copies of the 12,000-13,000 summary opinions issued between 1971 and 2000, but they were able to make it only through a small tax issue, 175 and more cases will inevitably emerge, even if the small case procedure apparently works "pretty well." 176 We can thus fairly call into question the wisdom of a statute, like Section 7463(b), that asks us to pretend like the judicial bell has not rung.
IV. THE PROBLEM FURTHER COMPOUNDED: THE TAX COURT'S JUDICIAL(?) POWER
The cases on unpublished opinions and congressional control over stare decisis involved Article III courts. The extension of those authorities to the Tax Court seems safe in light of Freytag v. Commissioner, which plainly indicates that Article I tribunals, like the Tax Court, "exercise the judicial power of the United States." 177 However, recent developments create uncertainty over the characterization of the Tax Court's power under the Constitution. To appreciate the controversy, one must first understand Freytag.
In Freytag, the Court addressed whether the appointment of the Tax Court's special trial judges comported with the Constitution. 178 Section 7443A(a) gives the Chief Judge of the Tax Court the power to appoint those judges, who enjoy explicit statutory authorization to hear specific types of cases. 179 Special Trial Judges may also conduct "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate." 180 The taxpayers in Freytag argued that this regime violated the Appointments Clause. Under that clause, the power to appoint an inferior officer, like a special trial judge, could vest only "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 181 The taxpayers argued that the Chief Judge fell into none of these three categories, thereby tainting the special trial judge who conducted their trial. 182 The Court ultimately rejected the taxpayers' arguments. It first agreed that the Chief Judge was not the Head of a Department-that term referred only to executive divisions, and not literally to every head of every government subdivision. 183 The Court further rejected the Tax Court's alleged placement within the Executive Branch, noting that Congress enacted Section 7441 to make "the Tax Court an Article I court rather than an executive agency," and any other classification would be "anomalous." 184 The Court then examined whether the Tax Court qualified as a Court of Law under the Appointments clause. To perform that analysis, the Court focused heavily on the nature of the power exercised by the Tax Court, concluding that it exercised "the judicial power of the United States." 185 The Court rejected the "literalistic" argument that the Constitution limited the grant of judicial power to that conferred in Article III. 186 Because "[t]he Tax Court exercises judicial power to the exclusion of any other function," it qualified as a Court of Law, and the Chief Judge's appointment of special trial judges satisfied constitutional requirements. 187 It would be impossible to untangle every implication of the Court's holding here. For now, the key question relates to whether principles of stare decisis extend to the Tax Court in the same way that they extend to Article III courts. Freytag certainly seems to suggest as much. The Court, rightly or wrongly, concluded that the judicial power of the United States extends beyond Article III. 188 Nothing in the opinion suggests that the judicial power operates differently when exercised by Article I courts. Consequently, if one accepts, as this author does, that principles of stare decisis restrict the exercise of the Article III judicial power, and that the fashioning of those rules remains the exclusive province of the courts, then the case law on noncitation rules and congressional control over rules of precedent applies with full force to the Tax Court.
However, a recent D.C. Circuit case complicates this analysis. In Kuretski v. Commissioner, the taxpayers argued that Section 7443(f), which allows the (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1879)) Id. at 889. In Freytag, Justice Scalia wrote a persuasive concurring opinion concluding that the Tax Court exercised the executive power, not the judicial power. President to remove Tax Court judges on limited grounds, 189 violates the separation of powers. 190 The taxpayers pointed to Freytag and argued that the statute established an impermissible inter-branch removal regime. 191 The President, as the holder of executive power, could not constitutionally remove Tax Court judges, who exercise judicial power. The taxpayers consequently wanted the court to declare Section 7443(f) unconstitutional, such that their case should be remanded and heard by a Tax Court judge operating without the threat of Presidential removal.
The D.C. Circuit rejected that request, fundamentally disagreeing with the taxpayers' characterization of Freytag. 192 According to the D.C. Circuit, the Tax Court "exercises Executive authority as part of the Executive Branch." 193 Consequently, Section 7443(f) presented no inter-branch removal concerns. The statute merely allowed the President to remove one of his subordinates.
To reconcile its holding with Freytag's, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the Tax Court, as an Article I court, could not exercise the judicial power conferred by Article III. Freytag merely referred to the Tax Court's judicial power in "an enlarged sense," 194 describing its role in resolving administrative disputes between taxpayers and the IRS. This made it similar to agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, who performed quasi-judicial functions but nonetheless fell under the Article II umbrella. Freytag's statement that the Tax Court "remains independent of the Executive . . . Branch" reflected a generic functionalist description, not a formal statement about the court's constitutional status. 195 Read broadly, Kuretski could free the Tax Court from constitutional restrictions related to the exercise of the judicial power. If the Tax Court really were just another agency, then the constitutionality of its nonprecedential opinions would not be examined through the judicial lens. Judges, as the last word on the meaning of the law, follow precedent to encourage certainty and to self-check the exercise of their power. 196 Agencies enjoy much more latitude in departing from prior practices, and judicial review can help mitigate some of the negative consequences associated with a whimsical executive. 197 However, the D.C. Circuit did not squarely address the precise consequences of its holding. It suggested that Section 7441 exempts the Tax Court from statutes that apply solely to executive agencies, given the statute's reference to a "court of record." 198 But Kuretski's implications for the Tax Court remain uncertain, 199 even after an alleged statutory "clarification." 200 The confusion over the Tax Court's status ultimately stems from different approaches to separation of powers analysis. Under a formal approach, the Constitution establishes three distinct branches of government, each of which is exclusively assigned the executive, legislative, or judicial power. Under a functionalist approach, however, some blending of powers may be permissible. Additionally, an entity that exercises a blend of powers, or which does not fit neatly into any particular Article, may have "no constitutional home" 201 Freytag adopted a functional approach, rejecting the "literalistic" argument that the judicial power conferred under the Constitution belongs only to Article III entities. 203 The Kuretski taxpayers, however, used Freytag to support a formal argument. 204 They argued that Article II cabins the President's removal power to persons exercising executive power. 205 This conflation of approaches-using a functionalist case to make a formalist argument-explains the confusion over the Tax Court's constitutional status. It is conceptually difficult to: (1) conclude, as Freytag did, that the judicial power extends beyond Article III to the Tax Court; and (2) assign the Tax Court to a single branch of government, as the D.C. Circuit was asked to do.
The contradictory approaches in the case law makes it uncertain whether, as a doctrinal matter, the Tax Court faces the same constitutional restrictions regarding stare decisis as do Article III courts. 206 The contradictory case law also makes it difficult to determine whether Section 7463(b) poses the same concerns posed by statutes that would control the rules of precedent for Article III courts. For purposes of this article, it suffices to say that if the Tax Court exercises judicial power under the Constitution, as will be assumed here, we can make the equations with Article III courts. If the Tax Court exercises a different power-the executive power or perhaps a "fourth" power-the issues become exquisitely uncertain and will be left for another day. 207 
V.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION Memo and S opinions present both theoretical issues and practical problems. They generate thorny questions related to the scope of the judicial power and to the separation of powers. The opinions also raise practical problems for the taxpayers who are confused by their purportedly nonprecedential status.
This Part argues that the Tax Court should abandon its purportedly nonprecedential treatment of Memo opinions and that Congress should repeal Section 7463(b). Constitutional concerns alone should warrant these actions, although the relevant case law remains undeveloped and could change. The (footnote omitted)).
203. 575 (1984) (examining the "difficulty in understanding the relationships between the agencies that actually do the work of law-administration, whose existence is barely hinted at in the Constitution, and the three constitutionally named repositories of all governmental power-Congress, President, and Supreme Court").
practical problems related to nonprecedential Tax Court opinions provide a more robust opportunity for discussion, and they will be the principal focus here.
A. MEMO OPINIONS
The Tax Court should no longer call its Memo opinions nonprecedential. The Tax Court, taxpayers, the IRS, and Article III courts routinely cite Memo opinions as persuasive or binding authority. To simultaneously maintain, as the Tax Court does, that Memo opinions lack precedential value sows confusion in the law.
A change in the status of Memo opinions would finally update the Tax Court's practices in light of its relocation in the structure of government. The Tax Court first adopted Memo opinions as the Board of Tax Appeals, an independent agency in the Executive branch whose decisions would be reviewed through that lens. 208 Given this initial structure, nonprecedential Memo opinions made perfect sense. Stare decisis does not apply to agencies, and judicial review would provide an appropriate check on any arbitrary Board interpretations. 209 But the Tax Court plays a weightier role now. It hears the vast majority of federal tax cases and apparently exercises the judicial power. 210 It even sometimes receives special deference from the appellate courts. 211 This increases the need for predictability and reliability in its own decision making.
Also, some of the original justifications for Memo opinions no longer seem relevant. Like unpublished appellate opinions, Memo opinions may
208.
See Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 725 (1929) ("The Board of Tax Appeals is not a court. It is an executive or administrative board, upon the decision of which the parties are given an opportunity to base a petition for review to the courts after the administrative inquiry of the Board has been had and decided.").
209. A reversal of Freytag would not necessarily revert the Tax Court to its 1920s status, under which it was not bound to follow precedent in the same way as courts. Section 7441's later enactment and its reference to a "court of record" might imply a congressional command to follow principles of stare decisis, as would, by negative implication, Section 7463(b) ' have been initially adopted for purposes of convenience. The Judicial Conference expressed concerns that publication of every opinion obscured the most significant ones, and circuit courts subsequently began issuing unpublished opinions. 212 Similar concerns apparently motivated the adoption of Memo opinions, along with concerns over excessive printing costs. 213 But today, electronic databases go a long way towards helping taxpayers separate the wheat from the chaff. And even if the Tax Court wishes to save on printing costs, online publication reflects a relatively inexpensive means to share decisions.
In Hart v. Massanari, Judge Kozinski identified another possible justification for nonprecedential opinions. 214 He cautioned that if every appellate opinion earned precedential status, this would "lead to confusion and unnecessary conflict." 215 Different judges "may use slightly different language to express the same idea," 216 but lawyers would seize on the differences to manufacture conflicts. This would compromise one of a court's core functions: to ensure "a coherent, consistent and intelligible body of caselaw." 217 Admittedly, the problem identified by Judge Kozinski appears frequently in the tax context. Taxpayers, the IRS, and even courts often give talismanic weight to isolated phrases in judicial opinions. This disturbing practice warrants some further attention because it contradicts the Supreme Court's approach, as illustrated in Commissioner v. Bollinger. 218 In Bollinger, the Court addressed whether a corporation acted as a mere agent for its shareholders regarding the record ownership of various properties. 219 If the corporation were a mere agent, as the shareholders argued, income and losses from the properties would belong to them. However, if no principal-agent relationship existed, tax consequences related to the properties would attach to the corporation.
The parties in Bollinger heavily debated a prior Court case, National Carbide v. Commissioner, which discussed various factors relevant to
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See Schiltz, supra note 54, at 1434 ("The Judicial Conference was motivated by concern over 'the rapidly growing number of published opinions . . . and the ever increasing practical difficulty and economic cost of establishing and maintaining accessible private and public law library facilities.'" (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF Id.
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See generally Comm'r v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988).
219.
Id. at 341. The actual facts in Bollinger were somewhat more complicated, in ways not relevant to the discussion here.
It is also doubtful that the Tax Court can firmly predict which opinions should form the authoritative body of tax case law. The Tax Court reaches its decisions in the context of a single dispute between a particular taxpayer and the IRS for a prior taxable year. It does not, understandably, have the foresight necessary to determine the issues whose importance will bloom in later years.
The allegedly straightforward nature of some disputes also does not justify Memo opinions. As Judge Boggs of the Sixth Circuit writes, the notion of "'easy cases' that are clearly dictated by existing precedent . . . is selfevidently wrong for both empirical and theoretical reasons." 227 Like numerous unpublished appellate opinions, numerous Memo opinions have faced sharp reversals. 228 As a practical matter, Memo opinions already enjoy ersatz precedential status, given the frequent reliance on them. The Tax Court, in a half-hearted way, even acknowledges the precedential effect of Memo opinions by allowing parties to cite them (just not for their precedential value). But as Judge Kozinski explained, if parties can cite a form of authority, that form of authority will inevitably influence decision making and creep into the corpus juris. 229 If the Tax Court really wants to deny precedential status to Memo opinions, it should stop citing them entirely and severely sanction practitioners who do. That approach, although seriously misguided, at least has the virtue of consistency.
The approach suggested here could have one major downside. If every opinion becomes precedential, the Tax Court, an already busy tribunal, might have to work even harder to ensure the accuracy and consistency of its opinions. Alternatively, the argument might go, judges will work an equal number of hours but on a larger number of precedential opinions, leading to a decline in their quality.
Commentators expressed similar doomsday scenarios during debates over unpublished appellate court opinions. 230 But the adoption of Rule 32.1 did not wreak havoc on the appellate courts. Formally establishing the precedential status of Memo opinions, which courts, taxpayers, and the IRS already pay attention to, will not cause the sky to fall.
General limitations on stare decisis can also help mitigate some of the dangers associated with inadequately reasoned cases. 231 If any Tax Court opinion passes on an issue only indirectly or maintains reservations about the rule applied, taxpayers rely on the opinion at their peril. Stare decisis does not provide an "inexorable command," 232 and courts may depart from their precedents in appropriate circumstances. But treating Memo opinions as precedential would, at the very least, require that the Tax Court justify its dismissals of them. 233 This would be far preferable to the current system, where the Tax Court sometimes dismisses Memo opinions with little more than casual hand-waving. 234 The extensive review process for Memo opinions also cuts against any argument that they provide effective shortcuts for fulfilling judicial responsibilities. The authoring Tax Court judge submits a draft of any opinion to the Chief Judge, who determines the Division or Memo designation. 235 This procedure encourages careful attention to all written opinions-the authoring judge does not know in advance which drafts will enjoy mere Memo status. Also, the Chief Judge distributes draft Memo opinions to all Tax Court judges for comment, which again suggests that the court already takes Memo opinions seriously.
Any extra work required for Memo opinions could also save energy down the line. That is, stare decisis promotes judicial economy because "no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it." 236 This principle surely extends to tax cases, where many litigants present similar issues related to their tax obligations.
In formally changing its approach to Memo opinions, the Tax Court could also easily avoid metaphysical questions related to the nature of precedent. That is, stare decisis comes in many forms, and the precise weight given to a prior authority sometimes varies with the jurist. But a shift in practices will not require a perfectly precise delineation of the exact weight accorded to Memo opinions, nor will it require a code-like guide to circumstances where Memo opinions may be trumped. All the Tax Court needs to do, whether by Rule (preferably) or via a reviewed opinion, is announce that Memo opinions enjoy the same precedential weight as Division opinions. Judicial development regarding the contours of stare decisis can then proceed undisturbed.
It is time for the Tax Court to abandon its 1920s approach to Memo opinions. The Tax Court honors its archaic nonprecedential rule in its breach, and whatever its precise constitutional status, the court operates much more like an entity that exercises the judicial power than one that serves purely bureaucratic ends. Taxpayers would benefit from clarification and consistency in the Tax Court's opinion practices. 237 
B. S OPINIONS
Section 7463(b), when placed alongside other statutes related to the structure and operation of the Tax Court, reveals congressional equivocation over the status of that entity. Some statutes, like Section 7482, reflect congressional intent to put the Tax Court on the same plane as Article III courts. But the small case provisions, including Section 7463(b), contemplate an entity that operates more like a federal agency than a court.
There is nothing inherently wrong with a voluntary process under which disputes are involved informally, with no opportunity for judicial appeal, and with no establishment of precedent. After all, taxpayers and IRS definitely resolve many disputes without going to court. 238 A streamlined set of procedures for taxpayers to contest their tax deficiencies seems like a wise idea.
But problems emerge when an entity that exercises the judicial power must administer a bureaucratic enterprise. Section 7463(b) and related provisions essentially contemplate that the Tax Court will decide S cases under looser standards than those applied in other cases. In explaining Section 7463(b), for example, the Senate Finance Committee expressed concerns that the Tax Court generally needed to consider "the precedent that it might provide for future cases" 239 whenever it issued an opinion, and this posed difficulties for taxpayers with small disputes. 240 Rather than entirely scrap the S case procedures, Congress should amend Section 7463(b) and eliminate its restrictions regarding the precedential value of S opinions. This would give the Tax Court greater rein to determine the prospective effect of S opinions, without creating additional dangers. To the extent that small cases involve simple statutes and simple facts, S opinions will contain only bare legal analysis and short factual recitations. To the extent that small cases implicate complex statutes or complex facts, then it is that much more important that stare decisis apply. The absence of appellate review under Section 7463(b) removes a significant check on the judicial power, making the constraining principles of stare decisis that much more important.
If Congress eliminates the nonprecedential rule in Section 7463(b), the Tax Court should treat S opinions as precedential for the same reasons discussed regarding Memo opinions. This may raise some concerns, given that S cases themselves are not appealable, and the court might hesitate to apply a new rule without allowing the taxpayer the benefit of further review. However, if an S case really treads new ground, the Tax Court can deny the small case election and decide the case under regular procedures. 247 Also, any precedential rule contained in an S opinion would face appellate review when the Tax Court later applied that rule in a regular case. Consequently, the elimination of Section 7463(b)'s nonprecedential rule should not overly disrupt the administration of small cases. 248 
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court's uncertain constitutional status raises many different theoretical and practical issues. 249 This Essay has focused on matters related to stare decisis, but the scholarly literature and pending cases present other constitutional issues, including matters related to the Tax Court's exercise of equitable powers and the President's removal power over judges. 250 (discussing how draft S opinions are submitted to Chief Judge for review).
247. Section 7463 allows a taxpayer to elect small case status only with the Tax Court's concurrence. Also, the IRS can request that a case be heard under regular procedures. See Kallich v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 676, 681 (1987) (noting that a taxpayer's "option to elect the small tax case procedure is not unlimited, even when the jurisdictional maximum for a small tax case has not been exceeded, as the election must be concurred in by the Court," and that the Commissioner can challenge the S case election on various grounds).
248. Regular Tax Court judges might scoff at allowing Special Trial Judges to establish binding precedential rules. However, that is merely a concern of internal politics and can be addressed in various ways, including by expanding internal review of S opinions prior to their issuance.
249. To address these issues, Congress should consider statutory amendments that would make the Tax Court fit more neatly into the constitutional framework. Establishing the Tax Court as a full-fledged Article III tribunal seems like the obvious solution, 251 but the legislative appetite for that approach seems small. Senator Hatch introduced a provision (later enacted) to affirm the Tax Court's independence from the IRS, 252 but Congress left alone the constitutional questions addressed in Kuretski. 253 Until Congress takes meaningful action or the Court revisits Freytag, tensions will persist regarding the exercise of the judicial power by a body that still retains some practices associated with its prior life as a federal agency. While waiting for a solution, the Tax Court should independently update its treatment of Memo opinions to account for its apparent change in constitutional status. Congress should also take a small interim step and eliminate the Section 7463(b) restrictions on the precedential status of S opinions.
